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Abstract : The paper examines an infinitely repeated 3-player extension of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. We consider a 3-player game in the normal form with incomplete information,
in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated
infinitely many times. At each stage, players make their choices knowing only the average
payoffs from previous stages of all the players. A strategy of a player in the repeated game is
a function defined on the convex hull of the set of payoffs. Our aim is to construct a strong
Nash equilibrium in the repeated game, i.e. a strategy profile being resistant to deviations by
coalitions. Constructed equilibrium strategies are safe, i.e. the non-deviating player payoff is
not smaller than the equilibrium payoff in the stage game, and deviating players’ payoffs do not
exceed the non-deviating player payoff more than by a positive constant which can be arbitrary
small and chosen by the non-deviating player. Our construction is inspired by Smale’s good
strategies described in [17], where the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma was considered. In proofs
we use arguments based on approachability and strong approachability type results.
1 Introduction
The Prisoner’s Dilemma with its generalizations are very important as an example of conflicts
and social dilemmas. As we can find in [10], social dilemmas are real life problems which have
two properties: ”1. each individual receives a higher payoff for a socially defection choice than
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for a socially cooperative choice, no matter what the other individuals in society do; 2. all
individuals are better off if all cooperate than if all defect.” An example of such situation in
real life is a problem of soldiers who fight in a battle. They are personally better off taking no
chances, yet if no one fight against the enemy, then the result will be worst for all of soldiers.
Such dilemmas can be found among resource depletion, pollution and overpopulation.
Social dilemmas are games in which there is a conflict between individual rationality and
optimality of the equilibrium payoff. Since it is observable that people cooperate with each
other in the real situations, game theorists have faced the obstacle, how to construct simple
tools to encourage players in such games to cooperate with each other. The model need to
approximate the real situation and strategies should be likely to use.
A natural approach is to consider the infinitely repeated game. Usually, all players observe
the whole history of action profiles used in previous stages of the repeated game. Such situation
is called the game with complete information. The strategies are functions from the set of the
histories into the set of actions. Payoffs in the repeated game are either the discounted sum of
stage payoffs or the limit of average payoffs. The aim of this approach is to obtain the Nash
equilibrium in the repeated game with the pair of payoffs which is close to the cooperation
payoffs in the stage game. Since the fifties of the last century there appeared various folk
theorems which was not explicitly published and, in many cases, the original author is unknown.
The classic Prisoner’s Dilemma is a 2-player game, in which each player has two actions,
usually denoted as C (cooperation) andD (defection). The game has a unique Nash equilibrium
– a pair of actions such that the action of each of the players optimize this player’s payoff given
the action of the opponent. The Nash equilibrium is the action profile (D,D) which is the
pair of strictly dominant actions i.e. playing D is better than C whatever the other player
does. What is more, both players benefit changing (D,D) into (C,C). So, the mechanism of
individual rationality fails in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and it leads to a loss of both players. It
means that the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal in this case.
One of solutions for lack of cooperation of the Nash equilibrium in the stage game is an
idea of good strategies introduced by Smale in [17] for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Every
pair of good strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the repeated game with Pareto-optimal payoffs
corresponding to the payoff of (C,C) in the stage game. The second advantage of the good
strategies equilibrium is the warranted minimal payoff for the non-deviating player. The min-
imal payoff is equal to the Nash payoff in the stage game. Good strategies have yet another
advantage that has not been pointed in [17]. Choosing a good strategy appropriately, the player
controls the second player’s payoff. For every ε > 0 there exists the ε-good strategy of the first
player such that for an arbitrary second player’s strategy, the first player’s payoff will be at
most ε smaller than the second player’s payoff. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is symmetric, so the
second player also can choose the ε-good strategy which provides him no worse payoffs than
the first player’s one minus ε.
In fact, good strategies have properties postulated by R. Axelrode in [4]. In 80’s Axelrode
studied the evolution of cooperation. It refers to how cooperation can emerge and persist as
elucidated by application of game theory. He organized a tournament in which game theory
experts submitted their strategies and each strategy was paired with each other for 200 iter-
ations of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Accumulated payoffs through the tournament was treated as a
score. The winner was the strategy submitted by Arnold Rappaport – Tit for Tat. The addi-
tional advantage of this tournament was detecting what properties strategies should satisfy to
encourage players to cooperate. They should be: nice, forgiving, retaliatory and are founded
on simple rules. Good strategies have these properties and, what is more, player cooperates
until the other player’s average payoff is greater than his average payoff plus ε. By choosing ε,
the player determines the level of his tolerance for the defection.
In this paper we shall consider the generalization of the idea of good strategies onto the
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Prisoner’s Dilemma type repeated game for three players. We consider the repeated game
with a partial monitoring. We assume that, after each stage, all players can only observe an
aggregated history – the arithmetic mean of the payoffs from previous stages. The stage game is
a symmetric 3-player game where each player has an action set consisting of two actions : I and
NI1. We assume that the action profile (NI, NI, NI) is the only Nash equilibrium, and the
sum of the players payoffs is minimal for this profile. The sum of players payoffs is maximal for
the profile (I, I, I). The strategy profile in the repeated game is a function s : S → {I, NI}3,
where S ⊂ R3 is a convex hull of the set of the payoffs in the stage game.
Our aim is to construct a strategy profile s∗ which is an approximated strong Nash equi-
librium in the repeated game under consideration. The constructed equilibrium is safe in the
meaning that the payoff of a player choosing strategy s∗i is not less then the equilibrium pay-
off in the stage game. This payoff is assured even if the other two players choose an arbitrary
strategy. Furthermore, the ε-good strategy guarantees that, in long time horizon, other player’s
average payoff will not exceed the good strategy player’s average payoff by more than ε.
The notion of the strong equilibrium in the framework of repeated games was introduced by
Aumann (see [1], [2], [3]), who showed that every payoff that belongs to the β-core of the stage
game is a strong equilibrium payoff in the corresponding repeated game (see [16, Thm. 6.2.2]
). Despite the fact that the payoff corresponding to the profile (I, I, I) belongs to the β-core,
our result is not exactly a case of the Aumann results. We have dropped the assumption of the
full monitoring. Players do not observe the full history, i.e. the sequence of actions selected by
all players in the previous periods. Instead, we assume that they observe the aggregate history,
i.e. the arithmetic mean of the previous payoffs of all the players. It is worth noting that the
results on the existence of strong equilibria (see [11], [12]) do not apply to the repeated game
considered in the present paper.
The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma for more than two players has been considered in [5]. The
ε-good strategies constructed in the paper have some additional properties to the strategies
in [5]. In [5] the authors base on similar approchability results as we do in this paper. The
difference is that authors consider N -players Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in which strategies are
stochastic processes. In our approach all strategies are deterministic.
The paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we present the basic information about sequences related to a map of a convex
set. We adopt Blackwell’s approachability method (see [6]) which was originally used in the
framework of 2-player repeated games with vector payoffs. We show that the Blackwell condi-
tion is sufficient to obtain the convergence of the sequence of arithmetic means to a set called
a weak attractor. The weak attractors introduced in Subsection 2.1 have different properties
in comparison with approachable sets in the sense of Blackwell. We provide an example of a
singleton being a weak attractor that does not satisfy the Blackwell condition. Such a situation
is not possible for approachable sets (comp. [15, Thm. 8]). In repeated games, there is consid-
ered a sequence of vector payoffs. Each payoff corresponds to one repetition of the state game.
Subsection 2.1 provides us necessary results to analyze the directions in which the trajectory
shifts and to examine the convergence of such sequence. This is crucial for defining the payoff
in the repeated game. Subsection 2.2 provides basic properties of the Banach limit which shall
be used to prove that ǫ-good strategies are ǫ Nash equilibria. In some of our arguments we not
only require that the sequence of mean payoffs converges to a set, but that almost all its entries
belong to the set. A similar problem named strong approachability was considered in [15]. In
Section 2.3 we adopt a Lyapunov function method for discrete and discontinuous dynamical
systems to obtain a deterministic strong approachability result.
In Section 3 we consider a repeated 3-player symmetric game. Every player has two actions:
1From now on, we choose to name strategies with I and NI, where I means invest and it corresponds to
strategy C and NI corresponds to strategy D.
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invest (I) or not invest (NI). The vector payoff B = (p3, p3, p3) corresponding to the strategy
profile (I, I, I) is Pareto optimal and the strategy profile (NI,NI,NI) is a Nash equilibrium
in the stage game with the payoff vector (r0, r0, r0)). We assume that, in the repeated game,
every player knows the average vector payoff from the previous stages of the game. The strategy
si : S → {I, NI}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is a function from the convex hull S of vector payoffs in the
stage game to the set of his actions {I, NI}. The strategy profile s = (s1, s2, s3) and the vector
payoff function G : {I, NI}3 → R3 determine the function ϕ = G ◦ s : S → S. The strategy
profile s and the initial point x1 ∈ S determine the trajectory x¯n(s, x1) of a dynamic system
given by
x¯n+1 =
nx¯n + ϕ(x¯n)
n+ 1
Our aim is to construct a strategy profile s∗ε = (s
∗
1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) such that for every x1 ∈ S
(1) lim
n→∞
x¯n = B,
where x¯n = x¯n(s
∗
ε, x1). If one player (for example player 3) deviates then
(2) lim sup
n→∞
x¯3n ≤ p3 + ε,
where x¯n = x¯n((s
∗
1, s
∗
2, s3), x1) and s3 : S → {I, NI} is an arbitrary strategy of player 3. If two
players deviate (for example players 2 and 3) then
(3) lim sup
n→∞
(x¯2n + x¯
3
n) ≤ 2p3,
(4) lim inf
n→∞
x¯1n ≥ r0
(5) lim
n→∞
dist(x¯n, {x ∈ S; x2 ≤ x1 + ε, x3 ≤ x1 + ε}) = 0
where x¯n = x¯n((s
∗
1, s2, s3), x1) and s2, s3 : S → {I, NI} are the arbitrary strategies of players 2
and 3 respectively.
If the payoff is a Banach limit (comp.[9]) of the sequence of average payoffs then the strat-
egy profile s∗ε is a strong ε-Nash equilibrium in the repeated game as a consequence of (1-3).
Property (4) implies that the non-deviating player’s payoff is no smaller than the payoff corre-
sponding to the Nash equilibrium in the stage game. Property (5) guarantees that the deviating
player’s payoff will not exceed the good strategy player’s payoff by more than ε. The results
presented in Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 give a partial answer to the question asked by Smale in the
last Remark in section 1 of [17, p. 1623].
Section 4 contains concluding remarks. In Appendix A we present the proofs of theorems
from Subsection 2.3.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Approachability results
Let H be a finite dimensional vector space and 〈·, ·〉, | · | denote an inner product and a norm
in H , respectively. We assume that S is a nonempty convex closed subset of H . By N ε(B) we
denote an ε-neighbourhood of the set B in S, i.e. N ε(B) = {x ∈ S : dist(x,B) < ε}. The
closure (the convex hull) of the set A we denote by cl(A) (co(A)) .
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We study limit properties of sequences (x¯n)
∞
n=1 defined by a map ϕ : S → S and an initial
point x1 ∈ S by
(6) x¯n+1 =
nx¯n + ϕ(x¯n)
n+ 1
, x¯1 = x1,
The sequence (x¯n) can be interpreted as a sequence of arithmetic means x¯n =
1
n
(x1+ . . .+ xn),
where xk+1 = ϕ(x¯k). The map ϕ defines a dynamical system βn : S → S by
βn(x) =
nx+ ϕ(x)
n + 1
, n = 1, 2, . . .
We denote by x¯n(ϕ, x1) a trajectory determined by (6).
We say that a closed set A ⊂ S is a weak attractor for a dynamic system determined by the
map ϕ if for every x1 ∈ S we have
lim
n→∞
dist(x¯n(ϕ, x1), A) = 0
where dist(·, A) denotes the distance to the set A. We provide some sufficient conditions for
being a weak attractor.
First we formulate Blackwell approachability type theorem that originally was presented in
[6] in the framework of repeated games with vector payoffs. We say that a map ϕ : S → S
satisfies the Blackwell condition for a set A ⊂ S in the domain D ⊂ S if
(7) ∀x ∈ D, ∃y ∈ ΠA(x), 〈x− y, ϕ(x)− y〉 ≤ 0,
where ΠA(x) denote the set of points in A that are proximal to x, i.e. ΠA(x) = {a ∈ A :
|a− x| = dist(x,A)}.
The deterministic version of the Blackwell approachability result can be formulated in the
following way.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that the map ϕ : S → S satisfies the Blackwell condition for a closed
set A ⊂ S in the domain D ⊂ S. If almost all elements of the bounded sequence x¯n(ϕ, x1) belong
do the set D then
lim
n→∞
dist(x¯n, A) = 0
We provide the proof of Proposition 2.1 for the reader convenience.
Proof : For a sufficiently large n we choose y ∈ ΠK(x¯n) and then
dist(x¯n+1, A)
2 ≤ |x¯n+1 − y|
2 =
∣∣∣∣ nn+ 1(x¯n − y) +
1
n+ 1
(ϕ(xn)− y)
∣∣∣∣
2
=
=
(
n
n+ 1
)2
|x¯n − y|
2 +
(
1
n+ 1
)2
|ϕ(xn)− y|
2 + 2
n
(n+ 1)2
〈x¯n − y, ϕ(xn)− y〉 ≤
≤
(
n
n+ 1
)2
dist(x¯n, A)
2 +
(
1
n+ 1
)2
C
where C is an upper bound of dist(xn, A). Setting dn = n
2dist(x¯n, A)
2 we have dn+1 ≤ dn + C
for n ≥ n0. Thus dn ≤ dn0 + (n− n0)C. So
dist(x¯n, A)
2 ≤
1
n
(
dn0 +
n− n0
n
C
)
.
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QED
Corollary 2.2 If the map ϕ : S → S satisfies the Blackwell condition for a closed set A ⊂ S
in the domain S, then the set A is a weak attractor for ϕ. If the set A ⊂ S is convex and the
map ϕ : S → A maps into the set A then the set A is a weak attractor for ϕ.
Taking A = (−∞, c] in Proposition 2.1 we obtain the following property of real sequences.
Corollary 2.3 Suppose that (an)
∞
n=1 is a bounded sequence in R and (a¯n)
∞
n=1 is the sequence
of arithmetic means, i.e. a¯n =
1
n
∑n
k=1 ak.If we have
(a¯n > c ⇒ an+1 ≤ c)
for almost all n and a fixed constant c ∈ R, then
lim sup
n→∞
a¯n ≤ c.
In many cases the set A is a weak attractor despite that the Blackwell condition is not
satisfied. Such a situation occurs in repeated games that we study in Section 3. Below we
present two properties of weak attractors which are necessary for our reasoning.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that the sets A, B ⊂ Rd are nonempty closed and B is bounded. If
a sequence xn satisfies
lim
n→∞
dist(xn, A) = lim
n→∞
dist(xn, B) = 0
then
lim
n→∞
dist(xn, A ∩ B) = 0
Proof : We choose an ∈ A, bn ∈ B such that
|xn − an| = dist(xn, A), |xn − bn| = dist(xn, B)
Since the set B is compact, we obtain that the sequences (an), (bn), (xn) are bounded and
they have the same nonempty set C of accumulating points. Thus limn→∞ dist(xn, C) = 0 and
C ⊂ A ∩ B.
QED
Proposition 2.5 We suppose that a closed set A ⊂ S is a weak attractor for the map ϕ : S → S
and a closed subset B ⊂ A satisfies
(8)
∀ε > 0, ∃δ > 0, ϕ satisfies the Blackwell condition
for the set cl(N ε(B)) ∩A in the domain N δ(A) .
Then the set B is a weak attractor for ϕ.
Proof : Fix x1 ∈ S and ε > 0. By (8), we choose δ > 0 such that almost all elements of the
trajectory x¯n(ϕ, x1) belongs to N
δ(A). By Proposition 2.1, we obtain
lim
n→∞
dist(x¯n, cl(N
ε(B)) ∩ A) = 0
Thus
lim sup
n→∞
dist(x¯n, B) ≤ ε
6
QED
The method illustrated in Proposition 2.4 and Proposition 2.5 bases on the scheme that we
explain in the following example.
Example 1 Let S = R2, a, b ∈ R2, a2 < 0, b2 > 0, a1 6= b1 and
ϕ(x, y) =
{
a if y > 0,
b if y ≤ 0.
We show that limn→∞ x¯n = d for every x¯1 ∈ R2, where the limit d is the point of intersection of
the interval ab with the line p = {(x, y) : y = 0}. The set D = {d} does not satisfy condition
(7). Indeed, if a1 < b1 and x > d1 then ϕ(x, 0) = b and 〈(x, 0)− (d1, d2), ϕ(x, 0)− (d1, d2)〉 > 0.
To show that the set D is a weak attractor we point out weak attractors A, B such that
D = A ∩ B. We set A = p and B = ab. The sets A, B satisfy the Blackwell condition (7). By
Theorem 2.1, we have
lim
n→∞
dist(x¯n, A) = lim
n→∞
dist(x¯n, B) = 0
Applying Proposition 2.4 we obtain that limn→∞ x¯n = d.
Finally, we shall formulate a property of the dynamical system.
Proposition 2.6 If the set S is bounded then for every ξ > 0 there exists N ∈ N such that for
all n > N and for all x ∈ S
|βn(x)− x| < ξ,
where the map ϕ : S → S determining βn is arbitrary.
2.2 Payoff in the repeated game
Considering a sequence of payoffs in the repeated games we always receive a bounded sequence.
As we presented in (6), the dynamic is the vector of the arithmetic mean of the payoffs received
in the previous repetitions. To analyze such sequence, the following proposition shall be useful.
Proposition 2.7 Suppose that a0, a1, . . . , ak ∈ R
d and let T ∈ N. Then for all ǫ > 0 and for
all n1, . . . , nk ≥ 0 such that n1 + · · ·+ nk = n, where n is sufficiently large, we have
T
T + n
a0 +
n1
T + n
a1 + · · ·+
nk
T + n
ak ∈ Nǫ(co{a1, . . . , ak}).
Proposition 2.7 is a consequence of the fact that T
T+n
a1+
n1
T+n
a1+ · · ·+
nk
T+n
ak ∈ co{a1, . . . , ak}
and T
T+n
|a0 − a1| is small where n is sufficiently large.
To define the payoff in repeated games we shall use the Banach limit (see [9]). The Banach
limit L is a continuous linear functional definite on the space l∞ of bounded scalar sequences. If
(xn) is a bounded sequence of points in R
d then Lim(xn) := (Lim(xn1),Lim(xn2), . . . ,Lim(xnd)),
where xn = (xn1, xn2, . . . , xnd). So Banach Limit can be extended onto the space of bounded
sequences of points in Rd. If ϕ : Rd → R is a linear functional then ϕ(Lim(xn)) = Lim(ϕ(xn)).
Proposition 2.8 If A is a compact convex subset of Rd and a sequence (xn) ⊂ R
d satisfies
limn→∞ dist(xn, A) = 0, then Lim(xn) ∈ A.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Lim(xn) /∈ A. Then there exists a functional ϕ : R
d →
R such that ϕ(Lim(xn)) > supa∈A ϕ(a). We have lim supn→∞ ϕ(xn) ≤ supa∈A ϕ(a). Thus
ϕ(Lim(xn)) = Lim(ϕ(xn)) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
ϕ(xn) ≤ sup
a∈A
ϕ(a)
which gives the contradiction.
QED
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2.3 A Lapunov type result
The Lapunov function method is typically used to study stability of equilibrium points for
dynamical systems. Using the Lapunov function method we obtain a strong approachability
result for a dynamical system determined by a multivalued map.
Let H be a Hilbert space and p1, ..., pk ∈ H be unit vectors, i.e. |pi| = 1. We define a
function V : H → R by
(9) V (x) = max
i∈{1, ..., k}
Vi(x) where Vi(x) = 〈pi, x〉.
The function V is a support function of the set {v1, . . . , vk}. So, the function V is convex,
positively homogeneous and lipschitz continuous with the constant L = 1 (see [14]).
Set
∆c =
k⋂
i=1
{x ∈ H : Vi(x) < c} = {x ∈ H : V (x) < c}.
Let us denote by ϕ : S⊸ S a multivalued map of a subset S ⊂ H .
Definition 2.9 We say that V is the Lapunov type function for the multivalued map ϕ with
the constant c > 0 if
(10) ∃0 < δ < c, ∀x ∈ S \∆c, ∀i = 1, ..., k, ∀ω ∈ ϕ(x), (Vi(x) ≥ V (x)− δ ⇒ Vi(ω) ≤ 0)
If the function V satisfies
(11) ∀x ∈ S \∆c, ∀ω ∈ ϕ(x), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} Vi(x) > 0 ⇒ Vi(ω) ≤ 0
then V is the Lapunov type function for ϕ with the constant c.
If V is the Lapunov type function for ϕ with the constant c and c1 > c then V is the
Lapunov type function for ϕ with the constant c1.
To explain why we say that V is the Lapunov type function observe that if Vi(x) = V (x)
then pi ∈ ∂V (x), where ∂V (x) is the subdifferential of a convex function. The condition (10)
implies the following inequality
〈pi, ω − x〉 ≤ 〈pi, ω〉 − 〈pi, x〉 ≤ 0− V (x) + δ < δ − c < 0 for x ∈ S \∆c
which means that V is the Lapunov function for the vector field f(x) = ω − x.
Proposition 2.10 Let S be a nonempty bounded convex subset of H and the function V :
H → R given by (9) be the Lapunov type function for the multivalued map ϕ : S⊸ S with the
constant c > 0. If a sequence (x¯n)
∞
n=1 satisfies
(12) x¯1 = x1 ∈ S, x¯n+1 =
nx¯n + xn+1
n+ 1
, xn+1 ∈ ϕ(x¯n)
then
∀c1 > c, ∃N, ∀n ≥ N, x¯n ∈ ∆c1
The proof of Proposition 2.10 is technical and it is presented in Appendix A.
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3 The model and main results
Let G be a 3-player symmetric game and every player has two pure actions: ”invest” (I) or
”not invest” (NI). By PI (PNI) we denote the payoff for an investing (not investing) player.
All payoffs depend on the total number of investing players. If n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is the total
number of investing players, then
n PI(n) PNI(n)
0 − r0
1 p1 r1
2 p2 r2
3 p3 −
,
The game G in the normal form is given by the matrix:
I (p2, r2, p2) (p3, p3, p3)
NI (r1, r1, p1) (r2, p2, p2)
NI I
.
when the third player invests, and by the matrix
I (p1, r1, r1) (p2, p2, r2)
NI (r0, r0, r0) (r1, p1, r1)
NI I
,
when the third player does not invest.
We shall assume that the functions PI(·), PNI(·) are increasing:
(13) 0 < r0 < r1 < r2 and 0 < p1 < p2 < p3.
We assume that
(14) p1 < r0.
By (14), the outcome (NI,NI,NI) is a Nash equilibrium. We assume that the more players
invest, the greater the sum of all players payoffs is, i.e.
(15) 3r0 < p1 + 2r1 < 2p2 + r2 < 3p3.
By (15), the vector payoff (p3, p3, p3) is Pareto optimal. In fact, the condition (15) means even
more – the vector payoff (p3, p3, p3) maximize the sum of payoffs. To obtain a strong equilibrium
in the repeated game we assume that:
(16) p1 + r1 < 2p3.
We additionally assume that:
(17) p2 < r2.
Observe that from the opposite inequality r2 ≤ p2 implies that (p3, p3, p3) is a Nash equilibrium
payoff, what we wanted to avoid.
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We introduce the following notations
A = (r0, r0, r0),
B = (p3, p3, p3),
C11 := (p1, r1, r1),
C12 := (r1, p1, r1),
C13 := (r1, r1, p1),
C21 := (r2, p2, p2),
C22 := (p2, r2, p2),
C23 := (p2, p2, r2).
If i players invest (i ∈ {1, 2}) then C ij denotes the vector payoff in the game G. If i = 1 then
j shows which one invests, while if i = 2 then j tells which player does not invest.
The strategy profile in the iterated game is given by a map s : S → {I, NI}3, where S is
the convex hull of vector payoffs set, i.e.
S = conv{A, B, C11 , C
1
2 , C
1
3 , C
2
1 , C
2
2 , C
2
3}
The strategy profile s determines a dynamical process βn : S → S
(18) βn(x) =
nx+ ϕ(x)
n+ 1
, for x ∈ S, T ∈ N,
where ϕ : S → S is given by the formula ϕ = G ◦ s. Observe that a pair (s, x1), where s is a
strategy profile and x1 ∈ S, uniquely determines a sequence (x¯n)
∞
n=1 by:
x¯1 = x1, x¯n+1 = βn(x¯n)
We denote the obtained sequence by x¯n(s, x1). A similar construction of a sequence was con-
sidered in Section 2. The strategy profile s and the initial point x1 ∈ S uniquely determine
a play path. The action profile in the next stage s(x¯n) depends on the average vector payoff
x¯n. The element xn+1 is the vector payoff in n + 1 stage. We do not assume that the players
observe the full history of the game. Instead, they observe aggregated history – the arithmetic
mean of vector payoffs.
Motivated by the Smale construction in [17] we define an ǫ-good strategy for the i-th player
sεi : S → {I, NI} by
(19) sεi (x) =
{
I if x ∈ Vi
NI if x ∈ S \ Vi
where
Vi = Ω
ǫ
i \Wi,
Ωǫi = {x ∈ S : xi > xj − ǫ and xi > xk − ǫ},
Wi = {x ∈ S : xi < r0 or xj + xk > 2p3}
where i, j, k are pairwise different elements of the set of players {1, 2, 3}. The player invests if
his average payoff is greater than the every other players’ average payoff minus ε. The player
stops investing if his playing I has been exploited by his opponents, that is either the average
payoff of the player is lower than the payoff guaranteed by Nash equilibrium (xi < r0) or the
sum of the other players’ average payoffs is greater then the sum of their payoffs corresponding
to the Pareto optimal profile (I, I, I) (xj + xk > 2p3).
First we consider the case when all players choose good strategies. Then the average payoffs
vector tends to the point B corresponding to the Pareto optimal profile (I, I, I).
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Theorem 3.1 Suppose that sεi : S → {I, NI} are the ǫ-good strategies for i = 1, 2, 3. Then
lim
T→∞
x¯T = B,
where x¯T = x¯T ((s
ε
1, s
ε
2, s
ε
3), x1) and x1 is an arbitrary element of S.
Now, we consider the case when two players play good strategies and the third one deviates
and chooses an arbitrary strategy. The deviating player does not improve their payoff more
then 2
3
ε, where the positive constant ε can be chosen arbitrarily small by the two non-deviating
players.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that the first and the second player choose the ǫ-good strategies sε1, s
ε
2
and the third player plays an arbitrary strategy s3 : S → {I, NI}. Then
(20) lim sup
T→∞
x¯3T ≤ p3 + ǫ
2
3
,
where x¯T = x¯T ((s
ε
1, s
ε
2, s3), x1) and x1 is an arbitrary element of S.
At the end of the section we show an example of the third player strategy, such that the upper
limit of his average payoffs is strictly grater than p3.
Now, we consider the case when two players deviate.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose sε1 is the ǫ-good strategy for the first player and s2, s3 are arbitrary
strategies. Then
(21) lim inf
T→∞
x¯1T ≥ r0,
(22) lim sup
T→∞
(x¯2T + x¯
3
T ) ≤ 2p3,
(23) lim
T→∞
dist(x¯T , V1) = 0,
where x¯T = x¯T ((s
ε
1, s2, s3), x1) and x1 is an arbitrary element of S.
Suppose that the payoff in the repeated game is defined as the Banach limit of average
payoffs. The inequality (22) provides that if two players deviate then at least one of them will
not improve his payoff. Conclusions (21) and (23) mean that the good strategy is safe, i.e.
the non-deviating player’s payoff is not smaller than the Nash equilibrium payoff in the stage
game and, moreover, the deviating player’s payoff is not greater than the non-deviating player’s
payoff plus ε (comp. Proposition 2.8).
By Theorems 3.1 – 3.3, we obtain
Corollary 3.4 The strategy profile sε = (sε1, s
ε
2, s
ε
3) satisfies (1-5). If we define the payoff in
the repeated game as a Banach limit of average payoffs, i.e Limx¯T then the strategy profile s
ε
is a safe and strong ε Nash equilibrium.
Below we provide some elementary properties of sets Vi that are used in the definition of
good strategies. We assume that i, j, k are pairwise different elements of the set of players
{1, 2, 3}. We shall use the following notations
V 3 =
⋂
3
i=1 Vi
V 2i = (S \ Vi) ∩ Vj ∩ Vk
V 1i = Vi ∩ (S \ Vj) ∩ (S \ Vk)
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If each player plays good strategy then
(24) ϕ(x) =


B if x ∈ V 3
C1i if x ∈ V
1
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
C2i if x ∈ V
2
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that player i plays εi-good strategy for i = 1, 2, 3. Then
(25) Ωi ∩Wi = ∅
(26) V 1i ⊂ Ωi
where
Ωi = {x ∈ S : xi = max{x1, x2, x3}}
If we assume that εi = εj (=: ε) then
(27) Vi ∩ (S \ Vj) ⊂ Ωi ∪ Φj
If we assume that εi = εj = εk (=: ε) then for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have
(28) V 2i ⊂ Φi,
where
Φi = {x ∈ S : xi = min{x1, x2, x3}}
Proof : If xi < r0 and xi = max{x1, x2, x3} then x1 + x2 + x3 < 3r0. If xj + xk > 2p3 and
xi = max{x1, x2, x3} then x1 + x2 + x3 > 3p3. Since 3r0 ≤ x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 3p3 for x ∈ S, we
obtain (25).
As (S \ Vj) ∩ Ωj = ∅ and (S \ Vk) ∩ Ωk = ∅ we have (S \ Vj) ∩ (S \ Vk) ⊂ S \ (Ωj ∪ Ωk) ⊂ Ωi,
and consequently we obtain (26).
To prove conclusion (27) we take i = 1, j = 2. As (W2 \W1) ∩ Φ1 = ∅ and (Ω3 \ Φ1) ⊂ Φ2 we
obtain W2 \W1 ⊂ (Ω1 ∪ Ω3) \ Φ1 ⊂ Ω1 ∪ Φ2. If x ∈ Ω
ε
1 \ Ω
ε
2 then either
x2 ≤ x1 − ε
or
x2 ≤ x3 − ε and x1 > x3 − ε (x ∈ Ω
ε
1)
In both cases we obtain x2 < x1 and thus x ∈ Ω1∪Φ2. Since V1∩(S\V2) ⊂ (Ω
ε
1\Ω
ε
2)∪(W2\W1),
we conclude that
V1 ∩ (S \ V2) ⊂ Ω1 ∪ Φ2.
If xi ≤ xj − ε (x /∈ Ω
ε
i ) and xk > xj − ε (x ∈ Ω
ε
k) then x ∈ Φi. If xi ≤ xk − ε (x /∈ Ω
ε
i ) and
xj > xk − ε (x ∈ Ω
ε
j) then x ∈ Φi. Thus (S \ Ω
ε
i ) ∩ Ω
ε
j ∩ Ω
ε
k ⊂ Φi
If x ∈ Vj then x /∈ Wj and hence xj ≥ r0 and xi + xk ≤ 2p3. If x ∈ Wi ∩ Vj ∩ Vk then either
xi < r0, xj ≥ r0, xk ≥ r0 or xj + xk > 2p3, xi + xk ≤ 2p3, xi + xj ≤ 2p3. In both cases we
deduce that x ∈ Φi. So V
2
i ⊂ Φi.
QED
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First we prove Theorem 3.3.
Proof : The strategy s∗1 is the ǫ-good strategy, so if x¯
1
T < r0 then x¯T = (x¯
1
T , x¯
2
T , x¯
3
T ) ∈ W1 and
s∗1(x¯T ) = NI. It means that the next vector payoff xT+1 belongs to the set {A,C
1
2 , C
1
3 , C
2
1}, so
x1T+1 ∈ {r0, r1, r2}, i.e. x
1
T+1 ≥ r0 (see (13)). By Corollary 2.3 we obtain that lim supT→∞−x¯
1
T ≤
−r0, so lim infT→∞ x¯1T ≥ r0.
Similarly, if x¯2T + x¯
3
T > 2p3 then s
∗
1(x¯T ) = NI. Thus the sum x
2
T+1 + x
3
T+1 is one of
the numbers: 2r0, p1 + r1, 2p2. From the assumptions (13), (15) and (16), it follows that
x2T+1 + x
3
T+1 ≤ 2p3. By Corollary 2.3, we get
lim sup
T→∞
x¯2T + x¯
3
T ≤ 2p3.
If x ∈ S \ V1 then s
∗
1(x¯T ) = NI. So, ϕ(x) = G((s
∗
1, s2, s3)(x)) ∈ {A,C
1
2 , C
1
3 , C
2
1} ⊂ V1. By
Corollary 2.2, the set V1 is a weak attractor for ϕ.
QED
Let πu : R
3 → u be the orthogonal projection onto the line u = {x ∈ R3 : x1 = x2 = x3}
and πP : R
3 → P be the orthogonal projection onto the plane P = {x ∈ R3 : x1+x2+x3 = 0}.
Obviously πu(x) =
(
x1+x2+x3
3
, x1+x2+x3
3
, x1+x2+x3
3
)
and πP (x) = x − πu(x). In the remainder of
the section we denote the projection of a point (a set) A onto the plane P by A˜, i.e. A˜ = πP (A).
The projection of the set S onto the plane P :
S˜ := πP (S)
is the convex hull of the hexagon with successive vertexes C˜11 , C˜
2
2 , C˜
1
3 , C˜
2
1 , C˜
1
2 , C˜
2
3 .
Set
v1 =
1√
2
(0,−1, 1) v4 = −v1
v2 =
1√
2
(−1, 0, 1) v5 = −v2
v3 =
1√
2
(−1, 1, 0) v6 = −v3
and
∆c(K) =
⋂
i∈K
{y ∈ S˜ : 〈vi, y〉 < c}
where K ⊂ {1, . . . , 6} and c > 0. One can easy check that
x ∈ Ωε1 ⇔ πP (x) ∈ ∆c({2, 3})
x ∈ Ωε2 ⇔ πP (x) ∈ ∆c({1, 6})
x ∈ Ωε3 ⇔ πP (x) ∈ ∆c({4, 5})
where c = ε√
2
. Setting Ωǫ =
⋂
3
i=1Ω
ǫ
i and ∆c = ∆c({1, . . . , 6}) we obtain
(29) x ∈ Ωǫ ⇔ πP (x) ∈ ∆c.
Now, we are able to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof : Fix x1 ∈ S. It is sufficient to show that in the sequence x¯T = x¯T (s
∗, x1) there
exists an element x¯N belonging to V
3, where s∗ = (sε1, s
ε
2, s
ε
3). Indeed, if x¯N ∈ V
3 then x¯N+k =
N
N+k
x¯N +
k
N+k
B, so limT→∞ x¯T = B.
First we show that almost all elements of the sequence x¯T belong to Ω
η =
⋂
3
i=1Ω
η
i , for every
η > 0.
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The map ϕ given by (24) is determined by the strategy profile s∗, i.e. ϕ = G ◦ s∗. Consider
ϕ˜ : S˜⊸ S˜ and V : P → R given by
ϕ˜(x) = {πP (ϕ(y)) : πP (y) = x}
V (x) = max {〈vi, x〉 : i = 1, . . . , 6}
We verify that V is a Lapunov type function for ϕ˜ with the constant c, for an arbitrary c > 0.
Let us fix x ∈ S˜ such that 〈v1, x〉 > 0. If y ∈ S and πP (y) = x then 〈v1, y〉 = 〈v1, x〉.Thus
y3 − y2 > 0 and therefore y /∈ Ω2 ∪ Φ3. By (26), (28), we have y /∈ V
1
2 ∪ V
2
3 . Since ϕ(y) ∈
{C11 , C
1
3 , C
2
1 , C
2
2 , B}, we obtain 〈v1, ω〉 ≤ 0 for ω ∈ ϕ˜(x)). We use similar arguments to show
that if 〈vi, x〉 > 0 and ω ∈ ϕ˜(x) then 〈vi, ω〉 ≤ 0, for i = 2, . . . , 6.
Fix η < min{ǫ, p3 −
2p2+r2
3
, p1+2r1
3
− r0} . By Proposition 2.10 and (29), there exists N such
that x¯n ∈ Ω
η for n > N . We claim that there exists M > N such that x¯M ∈ V
3. Suppose to
the contrary that x¯M /∈ V
3 for every M > N . Then ϕ(x¯M) ∈ {C
1
1 , C
1
2 , C
1
3 , C
2
1 , C
2
2 , C
2
3} for
M > N . By Proposition 2.7, we obtain that zM ∈ (
p1+2r1−η
3
, 2p2+r2+η
3
) for M sufficiently large,
where the point (zM , zM , zM) is the projection of x¯M onto u.
But, if x ∈ Ωη \ V 3 then x1+x2+x3
3
/∈ (p1+2r1−η
3
, 2p2+r2+η
3
). Indeed, if xi + xj > 2p3 and x ∈ Ω
η
then x1+x2+x3
3
> p3 −
η
3
. If xi < r0 and x ∈ Ω
η then x1+x2+x3
3
< r0 +
2
3
η.
QED
Now, we are in a position to prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof : Let x1 ∈ S and η > 0. Our aim is to prove that almost all elements of the sequence
x¯T = x¯T ((s
ε
1, s
ε
2, s3), x1) belongs to Ω
ε+η := Ωε+η1 ∩ Ω
ε+η
2 . We have
(30) x ∈ Ωε+η ⇔ πP (x) ∈ ∆c({1, 2, 3, 6}),
where c := ε+η√
2
. We show that the function V ∗ : P → R given by
V ∗(x) = max{〈vi, x〉 : i = 1, 2, 3, 6}
is the Lapunov type function for ϕ˜∗ : S˜ ⊸ S˜ with the constant c, where
ϕ˜∗ = {πP (z); z ∈ ϕ
∗(y), πP (y) = x}
and
ϕ∗(y) =


{C11 , C
2
2} if y ∈ V1 ∩ (S \ V2)
{C12 , C
2
1} if y ∈ (S \ V1) ∩ V2
{B,C23} if y ∈ V1 ∩ V2
{A,C13} if y ∈ (S \ V1) ∩ (S \ V2)
.
The map ϕ : S → S induced by the profile (sε1, s
ε
2, s3) is a selection of ϕ
∗.
If 〈v6, x〉 > 0 (x ∈ S˜) and πP (y) = x (y ∈ S) then y1 > y2 and thus y /∈ Ω2 ∪ Φ1. By (27),
we have V2 ∩ (S \ V1) ⊂ Ω2 ∪ Φ1. Thus ϕ
∗(y) ∩ {C12 , C
2
1} = ∅. So, we have 〈v6, ω〉 < 0 for
ω ∈ ϕ˜∗(x).
Using similar arguments we show that if 〈v3, x〉 > 0 then 〈v3, ω〉 ≤ 0 for ω ∈ ϕ˜∗(x).
Suppose that 〈v1, x〉 ≥ V
∗(x) − δ (x ∈ S˜) and π(y) = x (y ∈ S), where δ < η√
2
. Then
〈v1, x〉 = 〈v1, y〉 >
ε√
2
. If z ∈ Ωε2 then 〈v1, z〉 ≥
1√
2
(z3 − z2) >
ε√
2
. Thus, we have y /∈ Ωε2 ⊃ V2
and therefore ϕ∗(y) ⊂ {C11 , C
2
2 , C
1
3 , A}. So, 〈v1, ω〉 ≤ 0 for ω ∈ ϕ˜
∗|(x).
In the similar way we prove that if 〈v2, x〉 ≥ V
∗(x)− δ and ω ∈ ϕ˜∗(x) then 〈v2, ω〉 ≤ 0.
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By Proposition 2.10, we obtain that almost all elements of the sequence (πP (x¯T )) belongs
to ∆c({1, 2, 3, 6}). By (30), we have that almost all elements of the sequence (x¯T ) belongs to
Ωε+η. If x ∈ Ωε+η then x1 > x3 − (ε + η) and x2 > x3 − (ε + η) and so x3 < p3 +
2
3
(ε + η)
(x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 3p3 for x ∈ S).
QED
Remark. Reasoning as in the proofs of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, we can conclude that
good strategies are safe and strong Nash equilibria not only in the class of Smale’s strategies,
but also if ”loyal” players adopt good strategies, then ”disloyal” players can even play the
random choice in each repetition. It does not change the properties (20), (21), (22) and(23).
Example 2 Let the stage game G be given by:
n PI(n) PNI(n)
0 − 20
1 10 28
2 18 36
3 26 −
.
This game satisfies conditions (13) – (17).
Let s∗i : S → {I, NI} be the ǫ-good strategy for the i-th player, i = 1, 2, and 0 < ǫ <
1
2
.
Let Z = conv{A,B,C13 , C
2
3} = {x ∈ S : x1 = x2} and D = (26−
ǫ
2
, 26− ǫ
2
, 26+ ǫ
2
). We present
the construction of the third player strategy s∗3 : S → {I, NI} such that
lim
T→∞
xT (s
∗, x1) = D for every x1 ∈ Z
We have V1 ∩ Z = V2 ∩ Z. We set
s∗3(x) =
{
NI if x ∈ V1 ∩ Z ∩ co{B, D, C
1
3}
I elsewhere.
The map ϕ induced by the strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) is given by
ϕ(x) =


B if x ∈ V1 ∩ Z \ co{B, D, C
1
3}
C23 if x ∈ V1 ∩ Z ∩ co{B, D, C
1
3}
C13 if x ∈ Z \ V1
.
The values of the map ϕ outside the set Z have no influence onto the trajectory x¯T (s
∗, x1) if
x1 ∈ Z. The map ϕ : Z → Z satisfies the Blackwell condition for the triangle co{C
1
3 , C
2
3 , D}
in the domain Z. The map ϕ : Z → Z satisfies the Blackwell condition for the sum of intervals
BD ∪DC13 in the domain Z. By Proposition 2.1, the sets co{C
1
3 , C
2
3 , D} and BD ∪DC
1
3 are
week attractors. To conclude that the interval BD is a weak attractor we apply Proposition 2.5
taking A = BD ∪DC13 and B = BD. By Proposition 2.4, the intersection of weak attractors
co{C13 , C
2
3 , D} and A = BD is a weak attractor. The intersection equals to the set {D}.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper is concerned with the specific model of social dilemmas. Such models have a very
special place in game theory as they describe real social problems of modern world: resources
depletion, pollution and overpopulation. The main characteristic of such models is that each
player gain more by not cooperating when opponents fix their choices and all individuals are
better off if all cooperate. The lack of optimality of Nash equilibrium is the most interesting
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problem, because as we can observe in the real world, people are keen to cooperate with each
other on the certain conditions. Axelrode showed in [4] that strategies that effectively encourage
people to cooperate are: nice, forgiving, retaliatory and are found on simple rules.
The key idea in our approach is to apply Smale’s idea for 3-payer extension of Presoner’s
Dilemma. Our strategies are deterministic and satisfy conditions that are postulated by Axel-
rode in [4]. What is more, ǫ-good strategies satisfy condition (5) which guarantee that using
this strategy our payoff shall not be different than our opponents payoffs for more than ǫ. This
constant ǫ is totally controlled by the player who choose it. This property is not received by
any other author.
Our future aim is to extend the idea presented in [13] onto the type of games considered
in the paper - three players repeated social dilemmas. The idea is as follows. We would like
to analyze the repeated three players game by evolutionary games methods. To achieve this
goal, we threat the repeated game as a new game in which a player action is a point in the
β-core of the original game. Using methods presented in the paper each point from the β-core
should determine ε-good strategy. The main difficulty is to obtain the payoff in the case when
players choose different points in the β-core. The payoffs in the new game are determined by
the payoff in the repeated game.
A Appendix
In this Appendix we shall present the proof of Proposition 2.10. We start with the necessary
theorem.
Theorem A.1 If S is a bounded convex subset of H and V : H → R given by (9) is the
Lapunov type function for ϕ : S⊸ S with the constant c > 0, then
∃γ > 0, ∃α0 > 0, ∀α ∈ [0, α0], ∀x ∈ S \∆c, ∀ω ∈ ϕ(x)
V (αω + (1− α)x) ≤ V (x)− αγ.
Proof : By (10) we choose δ ∈ (0, c). Let M = sup{|x| : x ∈ S}. For x ∈ S \ ∆c we
define a set of indexes I(x) by
I(x) = {j ∈ {1, ..., k} : Vj(x) ≥ V (x)− δ},
and a subset Oi of S, related to the fixed index i:
(31) Oi := {x ∈ S \∆c : Vi(x) ≥ V (x)− δ}.
If x ∈ Oi then Vi(x) > 0 and 〈pi, ω〉 ≤ 0 for all ω ∈ ϕ(x). Obviously, i ∈ I(x) is equivalent to
x ∈ Oi for x ∈ S \∆c.
We fix positive constants: r, γ and α0 such that
r <
δ
2
, γ < c− δ, α0 < min
{
c− δ − γ
c− δ +M
,
r
2M
, 1
}
and take an arbitrary x ∈ S \∆c. The following condition holds true
(32) ∀y ∈ B(x, r) = {y ∈ S \∆c : ||x− y|| < r} ∃i ∈ I(x) V (y) = Vi(y).
Indeed, if j /∈ I(x), then Vj(x) < V (x) − δ. Since Vj and V are lipschitz continuous with the
constant L=1, we get Vj(y) < V (y). Therefore, there exists i ∈ I(x) such that V (y) = Vi(y).
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If i ∈ I(x) then Vi(x) ≥ V (x)− δ ≥ c− δ and 〈pi, ω〉 ≤ 0 for ω ∈ ϕ(x). Let α ∈ [0, α0] then
xα := αω + (1− α)x ∈ B(x, r) and Vi(xα0) ≤ Vi(xα). Moreover,
Vi(xα) ≥ Vi(xα0) ≥ −α0||ω||+ (1− α0)(c− δ) ≥ c− δ − α0(c− δ +M) ≥ γ
and
Vi(xα) ≤ (1− α)Vi(x) ≤ Vi(x)− αγ.
Thus we have obtained that
(33) ∀i ∈ I(x), ∀α ∈ [0, α0], ∀ω ∈ ϕ(x), Vi(xα) ≤ Vi(x)− αγ.
The function V has the following property: if V (a) = Vi(a) and V (b) = Vi(b) then V (λa+ (1−
λ)b) = Vi(λa+ (1− λ)b) for λ ∈ [0, 1] so the set
{α ∈ [0, α0] : Vi(αω + (1− α)x) = V (αω + (1− α)x)}.
is a closed segment. By (32) there exists s ≤ k and a partition 0 = β0 < β1 < ... < βs = α0
such that
(34) ∀j ∈ {0, ..., s− 1}, ∃i = i(j) ∈ I(x), ∀α ∈ [βj , βj+1], V (xα) = Vi(xα).
Let α ∈ [β0, β1]. In view of (34) there exists i = i(0) ∈ I(x) such that V (xα) = Vi(xα) and by
(33):
V (xα) = Vi(xα) ≤ Vi(x)− αγ = V (x)− αγ.
Suppose that
V (xα) ≤ V (x)− αγ, ∀k = 1, ..., j − 1 ∀α ∈ [βk, βk+1]
and take α ∈ [βj , βj+1]. By (34) there exists i = i(j) such that V (xα) = Vi(xα). Since
α ∈ [βj , βj+1], there exists ξ ∈ [0, 1] such that xα = ξω + (1− ξ)xβj . Therefore,
xα = ξω + (1− ξ)(βjω + (1− βj)x) = (ξ + (1− ξ)βj)ω + (1− ξ)(1− βj)x,
so
α = ξ + (1− ξ)βj ≤ ξ + βj.
It is obvious that
V (xα) = Vi(xα) = Vi(ξω + (1− ξ)xβj) = ξ 〈ω, pi〉+ (1− ξ)
〈
xβj , pi
〉
≤ (1− ξ)Vi(xβj) = Vi(xβj)− ξVi(xβj ) ≤ Vi(xβj )− ξγ.
Then we get
Vi(xβj)− ξγ ≤ V (x)− βjγ − ξγ = V (x)− γ(βj + ξ) ≤ V (x)− αγ,
hence,
V (αω + (1− α)x) ≤ V (x)− αγ.
QED
The proof of Proposition 2.10.
Proof : Fix (x¯n)
∞
n=1 satisfying (12). First, we prove that
(35) ∀M, ∃N ≥M, x¯N ∈ ∆c
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Suppose, contrary to our claim, that x¯n /∈ ∆c for n ≥ m. We choose k ≥ m such that
1
k
< α0,
where α0 and γ are given by Theorem A.1. Thus
V (x¯k+l+1) = V
(
1
k + l + 1
xk+l+1 +
k + l
k + l + 1
x¯k+l
)
≤ V (x¯k+l)− γ
1
k + l + 1
≤
. . . ≤ V (x¯k)− γ
(
1
k + l + 1
+ . . .+
1
k + 1
)
−−−→
l→∞
−∞
which contradicts to the assumption that V (x¯n) ≥ c for n ≥ m.
Fix c1 > c. By Proposition 2.6, we choose M such that |x¯l+1 − x¯l| < c1 − c for l ≥ M .
By (35), there exists N ≥ M such that x¯N ∈ ∆c. If x¯N+l ∈ ∆c then V (x¯N+l+1) ≤ V (x¯N+l) +
|x¯N+l+1 − x¯N+l| < c1. If x¯N+l ∈ ∆c1 \∆c then V (x¯N+l+1) ≤ V (x¯N+l) < c1.
QED
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